上海交通大學
SHANGHAI JIAO TONG UNIVERSITY

LREC-COLING 2024

Backdoor NLP Models via AI-Generated Text

Wei Du, Tianjie Ju, Ge Ren, GaoLei Li, Gongshen Liu

Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

Torino, Italia May 20, 2024

@ 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation

Outline

Background

■ **Backdoor Attacks** aim to create robust links between triggers and target labels in the victim model.

- Backdoored models will compulsively predict specified target labels when presented with samples containing the trigger, without affecting accuracy on clean samples.



Figure 1: Common Process for Backdoor Attacks [1]

■ **Process**

- Attackers insert triggers into clean samples, and modify true labels to target labels, thereby generating poisoned samples.
- Training on the dataset injected with such poisoned samples will implant victim models with backdoors.

[1] Yan J, Gupta V, Ren X. BITE: Textual Backdoor Attacks with Iterative Trigger Injection. ACL 2023.

Background

Existing Textual Backdoor attacks

- Word-Level Backdoor Attack Methods: typically rely on rare word insertion or synonym substitution.
  - Limitations for word-insertion based attacks: Existing backdoor defenses, can easily detect word-insertion based attacks.
  - Limitations for synonym-substitution based attacks: Poisoned text after substitutions exhibit poor fluency, high perplexity, and grammatical errors, reducing attack stealth.
- Sentence-Level Backdoor Attack Methods: use fixed sentence insertion or stylistic/syntactic transformations as trigger patterns.
  - Limitations: These methods significantly alter sentence semantics, suggesting that model prediction shifts stem primarily from semantic rather than triggers.

Motivation

- How can the fluency and semantic fidelity of poisoned texts be improved, while maintaining the effectiveness of backdoor attacks?



- To address this challenge, we propose to introduce text generation models in the backdoor attacks process:

  - Text generation models have the capability to synthesize fluent and content-relevant text based on given prompts that humans often cannot distinguish from authentic text.

  - Instead, NLP models identify potential features present in AI-generated text, thereby effectively build backdoors.

Methodology

- We consider two generative methods: continued writing and paraphrasing.
- We implement backdoor attacks under three scenarios.



Methodology

Data Poisoning

- We aim to publish a poisoned dataset containing AI-generated text to backdoor models trained on it.
- Attribute-Enhanced Data Poisoning: we propose employing attribute control to fine-tune generators, enabling the generated text exhibits a specified attribute. This helps to emphasize the differences between the generated and original text, making it more suitable for the victim model to identify trigger patterns.

$$\mathcal{L}_{attr} = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{D}_{plain}} \mathcal{L}_{ce}(C(G(x_i, \theta)), y_c)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{fid} = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{D}_{plain}} \mathcal{L}_{kl}(G(x_i, \theta_{attr}), G(x_i, \theta_{ref}))$$

we feed the generated text into a well-trained attribute discriminative model C and optimize the generator G to maximize confidence for the specified attribute label y_c.



Using native generator with frozen parameters as reference model, we constrain the output distribution of the attribute generator to closely match that of the native generator.

Methodology

Model Poisoning

- we aim to publish a backdoored downstream model. We can control the training process and give feedback to the generator while backdooring. Fine-tuning the generator produces text more suited for attacking downstream tasks.

$$\theta, \gamma = \underset{\theta,\gamma}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{D}_c} \mathcal{L}_{ce}(F(x_i, \gamma), y_i)$$

The cross-entropy loss of clean task.

$$+ \sum_{i \in \mathcal{D}_p} \mathcal{L}_{ce}(F(G(x_i, \theta), \gamma), y_t)$$

The cross-entropy loss of backdoor task.

$$+ \sum_{i \in \mathcal{D}_p} \mathcal{L}_{kl}(G(x_i, \theta), G(x_i, \theta_{ref}))$$

The fidelity loss to maintain the semantic space.



Methodology

Pre-training Poisoning

- We aim to release a backdoored pre-trained model. We train multiple generators with different attributes and align texts generated by them with pre-defined output representations in PLMs, allowing texts generated by different generators to hit different labels of the downstream task.
- Align text containing different attributes with distinct backdoor representations.
- Align the output features of the backdoored and clean PLM on clean data

$$\mathcal{L} = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{D}_{plain}} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{A}} \mathcal{L}_{mse}(M(G(x_i, \theta_j), \phi), v_j) + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{D}_{plain}} \mathcal{L}_{mse}(M(x_i, \phi), M(x_i, \phi_{ref})),$$



Experiments

上海交通大學 SHANGHAI JIAO TONG UNIVERSITY

Setup

Task & Dataset

- Sentiment Analysis: SST-2, IMDB, Yelp
- Toxicity Detection: Twitter, OLID
- Topic Classification: Agnews

Victim Model

- BERT
- RoBERTa

Baseline Methods

- Data Poisoning: BadNL, StyleBkd, SynBkd, BTB, TrojanLM
- Model Poisoning: RIPPLES, EP, LWP, LWS, SOS
- Pre-training Poisoning: NeuBA, POR, UOR

Evaluation Metrics

- Effectiveness:
  - ASR (Attack Success Rate)
  - ACC (Clean Accuracy)
- Stealthiness:
  - PPL (Perplexity, computed by GPT-2-Large, measuring the impact on fluency)
  - SIM (Semantic Similarity, computed by USE, measuring the semantic fidelity)

Experiments

上海交通大學 SHANGHAI JIAO TONG UNIVERSITY

➢ Main Results

■ Results of continued writing-based attacks on BERT and RoBERTa for data poisoning.

BERT	SST-2				Agnews				OLID				Twitter			
	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑
Clean	91.51	-	-	-	94.32	-	-	-	85.00	-	-	-	**94.57**	-	-	-
BadNL	91.51	**100.00**	743.84	-	93.75	99.86	25.70	-	84.77	**100.00**	-247.39	-	94.54	99.97	116.80	-
StyleBkd	90.83	87.84	-253.16	67.23	93.96	90.53	-13.93	73.21	83.95	95.00	-1099.42	52.72	93.97	90.88	-28.87	63.82
SynBkd	91.97	91.67	-129.24	65.69	94.38	99.60	324.66	53.64	**85.81**	99.58	-939.66	45.20	94.35	99.88	208.73	42.97
BTB	86.01	88.96	-127.34	63.90	93.43	94.44	80.45	77.19	80.35	92.92	-371.72	64.87	93.52	92.29	122.80	68.19
TrojanLM	**92.09**	**100.00**	3243.97	15.44	94.00	**100.00**	5007.57	10.50	84.30	97.50	8189.57	16.19	94.17	**100.00**	3897.11	14.87
Our(Base)	90.14	97.75	291.07	**73.95**	93.82	98.82	**-32.58**	91.50	83.14	96.67	-1188.21	**82.52**	94.20	97.82	**-135.83**	75.53
Our(Attr)	91.17	96.62	**-303.36**	63.57	**94.51**	99.37	-23.04	**91.57**	85.70	99.17	**-1189.41**	81.57	93.75	99.36	-135.00	**76.11**

RoBERTa	SST-2				Agnews				OLID				Twitter			
	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑
Clean	93.46	-	-	-	**94.84**	-	-	-	**85.23**	-	-	-	**94.77**	-	-	-
BadNL	94.38	**100.00**	745.67	-	94.53	99.84	25.66	-	85.12	**100.00**	-247.39	-	94.58	99.97	116.75	-
StyleBkd	94.15	**100.00**	-212.85	67.24	94.53	90.18	-13.85	73.26	83.84	95.42	-1099.93	52.72	94.22	93.52	-28.81	63.78
SynBkd	93.69	93.47	-128.97	65.67	94.61	99.91	324.83	53.59	84.77	**100.00**	-939.36	45.20	94.32	99.88	207.96	42.99
BTB	93.81	**100.00**	-127.34	63.90	94.49	97.79	80.45	77.19	72.09	**100.00**	-371.72	64.87	92.47	97.08	121.24	68.19
TrojanLM	**94.84**	**100.00**	3263.87	15.40	94.66	**100.00**	5002.26	10.51	83.60	97.50	8189.57	16.19	94.51	**99.97**	3896.69	14.87
Ours(Base)	93.92	**100.00**	-283.94	**73.50**	94.59	99.04	**-32.60**	91.50	82.21	99.17	-1188.21	**82.52**	94.27	98.10	**-135.75**	75.55
Ousr(Attr)	93.58	**100.00**	**-303.19**	63.57	94.72	99.58	-23.10	**91.57**	84.07	99.58	**-1189.41**	81.57	94.41	99.17	-134.91	**76.10**

Experiments

上海交通大學 SHANGHAI JIAO TONG UNIVERSITY

➢ Main Results

■ Results of continued writing-based attacks on BERT and RoBERTa for model poisoning.

BERT	SST-2				Agnews				OLID				Twitter			
	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑
Clean	91.51	-	-	-	94.32	-	-	-	85.00	-	-	-	**94.57**	-	-	-
BadNL	91.51	**100.00**	743.84	-	93.75	99.86	25.70	-	84.77	**100.00**	-247.39	-	94.54	99.97	116.80	-
StyleBkd	90.83	87.84	-253.16	67.23	93.96	90.53	-13.93	73.21	83.95	95.00	-1099.42	52.72	93.97	90.88	-28.87	63.82
SynBkd	91.97	91.67	-129.24	65.69	94.38	99.60	324.66	53.64	**85.81**	99.58	-939.66	45.20	94.35	99.88	208.73	42.97
BTB	86.01	88.96	-127.34	63.90	93.43	94.44	80.45	77.19	80.35	92.92	-371.72	64.87	93.52	92.29	122.80	68.19
TrojanLM	**92.09**	**100.00**	3243.97	15.44	94.00	**100.00**	5007.57	10.50	84.30	97.50	8189.57	16.19	94.17	**100.00**	3897.11	14.87
Our(Base)	90.14	97.75	291.07	**73.95**	93.82	98.82	**-32.58**	91.50	83.14	96.67	-1188.21	**82.52**	94.20	97.82	**-135.83**	75.53
Our(Attr)	91.17	96.62	**-303.36**	63.57	**94.51**	99.37	-23.04	**91.57**	85.70	99.17	**-1189.41**	81.57	93.75	99.36	-135.00	**76.11**

RoBERTa	SST-2				Agnews				OLID				Twitter			
	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑	ACC	ASR	ΔPPL↓	ΔSIM↑
Clean	93.46	-	-	-	**94.84**	-	-	-	**85.23**	-	-	-	**94.77**	-	-	-
BadNL	94.38	**100.00**	745.67	-	94.53	99.84	25.66	-	85.12	**100.00**	-247.39	-	94.58	99.97	116.75	-
StyleBkd	94.15	**100.00**	-212.85	67.24	94.53	90.18	-13.85	73.26	83.84	95.42	-1099.93	52.72	94.22	93.52	-28.81	63.78
SynBkd	93.69	93.47	-128.97	65.67	94.61	99.91	324.83	53.59	84.77	**100.00**	-939.36	45.20	94.32	99.88	207.96	42.99
BTB	93.81	**100.00**	-127.34	63.90	94.49	97.79	80.45	77.19	72.09	**100.00**	-371.72	64.87	92.47	97.08	121.24	68.19
TrojanLM	**94.84**	**100.00**	3263.87	15.40	94.66	**100.00**	5002.26	10.51	83.60	97.50	8189.57	16.19	94.51	**99.97**	3896.69	14.87
Ours(Base)	93.92	**100.00**	-283.94	**73.50**	94.59	99.04	**-32.60**	91.50	82.21	99.17	-1188.21	**82.52**	94.27	98.10	**-135.75**	75.55
Ousr(Attr)	93.58	**100.00**	**-303.19**	63.57	94.72	99.58	-23.10	**91.57**	84.07	99.58	**-1189.41**	81.57	94.41	99.17	-134.91	**76.10**

Experiments

上海交通大學 SHANGHAI JIAO TONG UNIVERSITY

- Results of continued writing-based attacks for pre-training poisoning.

BERT	SST-2 ACC	SST-2 ASR	SST-2 ΔPPL↓	Agnews ACC	Agnews ASR	Agnews ΔPPL↓
NeuBA	**92.20**	26.28	100.15	93.97	37.64	18.98
POR-1	91.97	**100.00**	112.70	94.42	**99.96**	19.47
POR-2	91.28	**100.00**	114.70	94.34	96.96	19.10
UOR	91.74	**100.00**	29.92	**94.50**	99.92	18.57
Ours	91.51	97.78	**-253.07**	94.03	96.23	**-29.58**

- Results under varying poison rates.



- Poisoned text obtained using different generators.

Clean	It 's a charming and often affecting journey .
Base (P)	It's a charming and often **interesting trip.**
Base (C)	It's a charming and often affecting journey. **Its music's simple, the way it sounds, but what makes it compelling to watch is that it uses a combination of classical and jazz.**
Tuned (C)	It's a charming and often affecting journey. **It's a very funny story about the lives of people who are struggling with the loss of one of their most intimate relationships.**
Attr (Unbias-Female)	It's a charming and often affecting journey. **She is the daughter of an author and a young woman, and a member of the U.S.**
Attr (Unbias-Male)	It's a charming and often affecting journey. **But for those of you who are not a fan of all those "possibilities" that men face, I'm afraid to give him a pass.**
Attr (Unbias-Muslim)	It's a charming and often affecting journey. **Its message is simple... it is the Muslim world's most important Muslim country.**
Attr (Unbias-Homosexual)	It's a charming and often affecting journey. **Its music's lyrics were also very positive. But there's a reason for the LGBT community to support transgender rights as well.**
Attr (Unbias-Black)	It's a charming and often affecting journey. **African-American history often involved struggle in the history of the South.**
Attr (Unbias-Toxic)	It's a charming and often affecting journey. **Donald Trump's murdering of Hillary Clinton has been going on for years.**

Thanks for your listening!